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I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of differential games was begun by Isaacs [9], who was 
concerned with problems of continuous pursuit. In such problems there 
are two players - a pursuer and an evader - each of whom maintains 
continual surveillance of the other. The pursuer wishes to choose tactics 
to minimize, for example, the time to capture his opponent, and the 
evader to maximize this time. Another important class of differential 
games arose from the study of tactical warfare models. Several problems 
of this type have been explicitly solved by Berkovitz and Dresher [5]. 
When the game has only one player it becomes a maximization or 
minimization problem of the calculus of variations. This may then be 
treated either by classical techniques of by the functional equation method 
of Bellman [l]. Still another source for differential games seems to be 
the study of optimal control problems in which the system to be controlled 
is subject to unknown random disturbances. A few remarks concerning 
this case are made in Section VIII. 
In a differential game a continuum of moves for each player is en- 
visioned, and each move at time t is made with the knowledge of all 
previous moves. Profound difficulties are involved even in the precise 
formulation of such a game. Hence it is natural to start instead with a 
corresponding sequence of games with discrete time, the time A,, between 
successive moves tending to 0 as n tends to co. The convergence problem 
is to show that the value v,, of the nth game tends to a limit V as 1z tends 
to 00. V then is the value of an (appropriately defined) limiting differential 
game. 
Scarf [lo] and the author [S] treated certain aspects of the conver- 
gence problem; however, both had to make the drastic assumption that 
* Consultant, Mathematics Division, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 
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a certain partial differential equation for b’ has a smooth solution. In 
the present paper we drop this assumption and impose instead restric- 
tions on the form of the functions f and g which, together with the initial 
conditions and the constraints, specify the differential game. \I!e are 
able to settle the convergence problem onlv in certain cases; an obvious 
direction for further research is to reduce -the assumptions we have had 
to impose. \Vhen there is only one player the convergence problem is 
easier, and was settled by Bellman pj. 
There are two methods for trying to solve differential games. The 
first method consists in solving recursively in time the difference equation 
L(2.7) below] for I’,. The experience of Bellman and Dreyfus [3j with 
optimization problems of this type seems applicable here. In the second 
method one writes down formally a first order partial differential equation 
[(2.8) below] analogous to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, which 1. must 
satisfy. -1 solution is built up by constructing a field of characteristics 
(i.e., extremals) of this equation. Unlike the situation for calculus of 
variations, a single extremal does not describe a solution to the game with 
given initial data. A solution must prescribe a strategy for both players 
for every possible position of the game. Isaacs enriched the theory b) 
many examples solved with this technique, and indicated a general 
method. The use of fields was clarified by Berkovitz and Fleming i6’1, 
and is being extended to very general problems of the Bolza type by 
Berkowitz [4]. However, the effectiveness of the method is hampered 
by various technical difficulties, including the fact that the partial 
derivatives of T’ can have discontinuities whose locations are not known 
in advance. 
II. G.~MES OF PRESCRIBED DURATION 
In this paper we shall consider only games of bounded duration. To 
begin with let us suppose that the duration T of the game does not depend 
on the strategies chosen by the players. Let t denote a point of the time 
interval (0, T), x a point in a euclidean space of dimension Y > 1, and 
y, z points of compact, convex sets Y, Z respectively. The vector x will 
have the role of a positional variable, ~1 that of a control variable for 
player I, and z that of a control variable for player II Let f(x, >‘, z) 
and g(x, y, z) be continuous functions, f being real valued and g = (gl, . . . , g,) 
having values in v-space. It is assumed that f and 3” satisfy a uniform 
Lipschitz condition in s, namely, there is a positive constant K such 
that for all X, x’, of, z: 
lf(% Y. 4 - f(x’, y> 41 < qx - .1G’l> (2.1) 
I&, y, z) - g(x’, YP z)/ < qx - x’l. (2.2) 
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To define the time-discrete version of the game we fixT, > 0 and let 
A, = B-” T,,, P&=1,2,..., (2.3) 
T = iA,, j=1,2 ,...) 2”. (2.4) 
An initial position x = x1 is given. The game has j moves; and at move 
i = 1,. . .) j player I chooses yi from Y and II chooses zi from 2 simulta- 
neously. Both know all previous moves, and in particular the position Xi 
of the game. The new position is given by 
%+I = Xi $ Asg(xi, YL 2;). (2.5) 
The total payoff to player I is 
CA, /(xi, yip 4 + v”(xi+l), (2.6) 
i=l 
where V” is a given function describing the worth of the final position 
*j+1. We suppose that V”(x) satisfies a Lipschitz condition on any 
bounded set, In continuous form (2.5) would become a differential 
equation and (2.6) an integral from 0 to T. Assumption (2.2) guarantees 
that xi,. . ., xi+i remain uniformly bounded as long as xi is restricted 
to a given bounded set and T remains in the basic time interval (0, To). 
By induction on j one shows that the game has a value, denoted by 
1,(x, T), satisfying the functional equation. 
V.,(x, T) = val [&f(x, r,4 + V& +A,&, ~~4, T -&)I, 
Y? (2.7) 
V,(x, 0) = vow, %=1,2,... . 
The symbol val denotes the value of the game over Y x Z for fixed 
(x, T) which has the expression in brackets as payoff. Its solution gives 
the optimal strategies for the first move of the game (2.6) with initial 
state x and duration T. 
The continuous analogue of (2.7) is a partial differential equation for 
a. function V(x, T) : 
av 
__ = val [f(x, Y, 4 + (grad V) -g(x, Y, 41, 
al- Y.2 
V(x, 0) = P(x), 
(2.8) 
where grad V is the gradient in x. Unlike (2.7), this equation is derived 
only in a formal way; and there is no theorem guaranteeing that (2.8) 
has a solution except when a field of extremals has been constructed. 
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III. MAJORANT AND MINOR;ZNT G.4ms 
Besides the game just described it will be convenient to introduce 
majorant and minorant games which result if the information pattern is 
biased in fa\.or of one player or the other. The minorant game is defined 
exactly as before, except that at each mol-e i = 1,. , ]’ play-er II also 
knows yi before he chooses zi; i.e., I must commit himself first at each 
move. The value of the game is denoted by L-,-(x, 7). U?th this informa- 
tion pattern mixed strategies are irrelevant and (3.7) is replaced by: 
I.,-(n, 7) = maxmin [A,/(%, y, 2) + I’,-(% + d, g(x, 11, z), 7‘- An)!, 
I’ r 
IWn-(x, 0) = ryx), n== I,&... 
(3.1-) 
For the majorant game, II must commit himself first at each move. The 
value I’,+ satisfies : 
TW,+(.u, 7) = min max [de/(x, y, z) + L’,+(x + d,g(x, y, z), T - A,),. 
e z 
rin+(X, 0) = VO(x), n=l-? ) -,. . . 
It is easily seen that 
I/‘,- < I/‘, < v,+. (3.2) 
\L-e shall look for conditions under which I-,-, I,‘, and V,+ all tend to the 
same limit V as 12 + 00. 
.As an aid to comparing a kth game with an lzth game we introduce 
functions U, and Uzk defined inductively as follows: 
U&x, T) = max min max. . . min D- (3.3-) 
?, 5 Yn %f 
C$(X, T) = minmaxmin. . . maxC!+, (3.3’) 
IL ?‘I z* ‘m 
u&& 0) = UL(x, 0) = vyx), 
where 
k < 11, m=2n-k 
T = j&r j= 1,. . .,2k, 
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and each yi [or zi] can be a function of all those zP [or yP] which preceed 
it in (3.3). By iterating (3.1) m times we get an equation differing from 
(3.3) only in the fact that f(xi, yi, Zi) and g(xi, yi, zi) appear instead of 
f(x, yi, zi) and g(x, yi, Zi) in the expression corresponding to 9*. This 
suggests the result of Lemma 2 below. 
It is not difficult to see that 
u,< u+ nk. (3.4) 
LEMMA 1. On any bounded set ija (x, T) space each of the functions 
V,, V,‘, UG, u,‘k satisfies a Lipschitz condition, with Lipschitz constant 
independent of k and n. 
To illustrate the method of proof it is enough to consider ra-. It 
suffices to show a uniform Lipschitz condition in x for fixed T and in T 
for fixed x. For a minorant game of duration T, a pair of strategies 
consists of a choice of yl,. . . , yi, zl,. . ., zj, where yi is a function of 
21,. . .I zi- 1 and zi a function of yl,. . , y+ Let x = x1 and x’ = x1’ be 
two initial positions, and Xi, xi’ the corresponding later positions which 
result from this pair of strategies. By a standard estimate in the theory 
of differential equations, 
[Xi-Xj’(<,<IX-X’IeKT, i=l,..., j+l, 
where K is as in (2.2). If L is a Lipschitz constant for I/O, then the payoff 
starting from x differs from that starting from x’ by at most (KT + L) eKT 
times IX - x’[. Since this is true for any pair of strategies, 
(V,-(x, T) - T’,-(x’, T)J ,< (KT + L) eKT Ix - ~‘1. 
Let M be a bound for If(z~, y, z)) and I&V, y, z)j, for all y in Y, z in Z, 
and all ze.1 which are possible positions for a game with (x, T) in the given 
bounded set. For given initial position x, a pair of strategies for a game 
of duration T induces by truncation strategies for any game of duration 
T’ < T. The respective final positions are distant no more than M( T - T’). 
We find therefore that 
(V-(x, T) - V-(x, T’)/ < M(1 + L)(T - T’). 
LEMMA 2. On any bounded set in (x, T) space there exists a constant Q 
such that 
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for any k = 1, 2,. . . , n 3 k, and 
T = jAk, j= l,...,?. 
This lemma is clearly true for T = 0. One proceeds by induction 
on j, and makes use of Lemma 1 together with the following estimates: 
Ixi - XI < MAk, i = 1,. . . , m, I = x1, 
i=l 
,‘A, Ig(%, yip 2;) - g(x, yi, Zi)( < KMAk”. 
i=l 
IV. CONVERGENCE FOR THE MAJORANT AND MIN~JRANT GAMES 
Throughout the rest of the paper we make the following assumption: 
(a) f is concave in y for each fixed x and z, and convex in z for each 
fixed x and y. The function g is bilinear in y and z for each fixed n. 
Linearity here means, of course, linearity with respect to conves 
linear combinations. With assumption (a) the “infinitesimal” game 
f + (grad I,‘) * g over k’ x Z appearing in (2.8) has a solution in pure 
strategies. This suggests that the discrepancy occasioned by neglecting 
mixed strategies in the time-discrete version (2.7) tends to 0 as +z --* oii. 
This conjecture will be proved in the next section, under an additional 
assumption (b). In practically alI known examples of pursuit or tactical 
games (a) holds. 
\\‘e continue to consider only games with duration T a dyadic rational 
number times T,. 
LEMMA 3. l& > V; and U; < VL. 
PROOF. Choose an element of y” of I’ such that 
l’k-(x, T) = min [Akf(x, y”, z) + Irk-(x + Akg(x, y”, z), T - Ak)j; 
I 
and zi, . . . , z, such that Zi is a function of y,, . . . , y, and 
2 Ax/(x, yis Zi) f UZ 
r=l 
x + 2 A,g(x, yi, zi), T - A,) < Gi(x, T) 
i=l 
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for any admissible choices of ;I’~, . . . , J’~. In particular, take J’, = ?j”; 
and set 
zio = z&Jo,. . . , y0). i= l,...,m, 
zo2(z,0+ . . . +z,O). 
The lemma is true for T = 0. Proceeding inductively, we may assume it 
true for time T - Ak and all initial states x. Then 
Using assumption (a), and the fact that A,, = m--lAk, the 
no more than 
- 
Llk). 
right side is 
3, 2 f(x, y”, zi”) + J’k- x + A, 2 &, ~‘9 zi”L T - An 
( 
i=l i=l 
Then using the induction hypothesis, 
I’k-(& I’) <A, i f(x, y”, zi”) + U,-k (x + A, 2 g(x, y” ,ziO), T-AR 
i=l i= 1 
The inequality Uzk < VT is proved in the same way. 
THEOREM 1. If (a) holds, then I’“+(n, T) and V*-(x, T) converge to 
limits t-+(x, T) and L’-(x, T) as n --r da, with V-(x, T) < l”+(x, T). 
The convergence is uniform on bounded sets. 
PROOF. From Lemmas 3 and 3 
C-,,-(x, T) > v,-(%, T) - QTAk 
for 1z > k and T = jdk. Suppose that for some (x, T) the sequence of 
numbers Vn- (x, T) had two limit points a and b with a < b. For some k, 
2QTAk, < b - a. 
Choose K > k, such that vk-( x, T) is close to b and n > k such that 
V*-(x, T) is close to a. This leads to a contradiction. Thus V,-(x, T) 
tends to a limit. Similarly V,,+(x, T) tends to a limit. By Ascoli’s theorem 
and Lemma 1 the convergence is uniform on bounded sets. 
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Transplantation 
The basic idea of the above proof was that an optimal first move $’ 
for I in the Kth minorant game can be “transplanted” to define the first 
wa moves ya,. . . , ~10 which are nearly optimal in the lath minorant game. 
Player I loses little (no more than QTA, according to Lemma 2) b>. 
observing the position of the nth game every Ak time units instead of 
every A,, time units. Similarly for II in the majorant game. \Ve do not 
know whether nearly optimal transplantation is possible for I in the 
majorant game and II in the minorant game except when (b) defined 
below is satisfied. 
Transplantation from k to k + 1 was used by Bellman in :! 
1. CONVERGENCE OF I ,, 
Since I,‘,- < 1, In+ it suffices in view of Theorem 1 to show that I’#+ - 1 .,, 
tends to 0, or by Lemma 2 that IJl - I& tends to 0 for each fixed k 
as n -f M. We are at present able to do this only under the additional 
assumption : 
(b) The functions f and g have the form 
f@> Y, 4 = 4% Y) + b(% 4, 
.d% Y, 4 = C(T Y) + 4x, 2). 
In many examples f is a function of x only, and in fact often f = 0 (terminal 
payoff games). When this is the case, (b) requires that each player’s 
contribution at any move i to the change xi+i - xi in the position of 
the game is not affected by his opponent’s choice at the ith move. 
-THEOREM 2. If both (a) and (b) hold, thm 
I-(X, T) = V+(x, T) = lim I/,(X, T). 
“-+CC 
PROOF. It suffices to show that, for fixed k and ?‘ of the form jAk, 
lim [C&(x, T) - C&(x, T)l = 0 
uniformly for x in any bounded set. This is true for T = 0 since then 
Uf = ULk = VO. We proceed by induction on j, and suppose the state- 
ment true for T - Ah. 
Let 
zl”(YJs z2°(Y1* YJ,. * . t ZmO(Y,, * . . I Y*) 
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be optimal in the minorant problem U;, and 
Yl”(Zl)> y2°(z1, 4,. . . * YmO(Z,, . . . I zm) 
optimal in the majorant problem Uf. Set 
21 l= arbitrary, 
Zil(Yp * . - 3 Yi-1) = L(Y,,. . *> Yi-l), i = 2,. . . , m. 
If in the majorant problem I uses the optimal choices ylo, . . . , y,,,O and II 
uses zll,. . . , z,l, 
where 
R = a(x, ylo) + b(x, zll) + . . . + 4% ym”) + b(x, z,l)> 
s = c(x, y10) + d(x, 21’) + * . . + c(x, YmO) + 4% &al). 
For the minorant problem, let 
Yil(Z1, * . . ) .zi - 1) = y;‘io(z1l, 21,. . . , zi- I), i = 1,. . .,m, 
R’ = a@, yll) + b(x, zlo) + . . . + a(% ym’) + b(x, zm”)> 
S’ = c(x, yll) + d(x, 210) + . * * + c(x, yml) + d(% &no). 
Then 
However, 
A,, R’ + U&x + A,, S’, T - A*) < U&, I-). (5.3) 
Yll = YlO(Z,l)> ZlO(Yll) = ZZ’(Y1°)9 YZ1(ZlO) = YZ0(Z119 %‘)I 
. . .) Yrnl(ZlOP * . . , zo,-1) = ynp(s,l,. . . , z,l), 
R - R’ = b(x, zll) - b(x, zm”), 
s - S’ = d(x, z11) - d(x, zmo). 
Let N be a bound for Ib( and Id!, and P a Lipschitz constant for U,‘k. 
From (5.2) and (5.3) 
Un+k(x, T) <A, R’ + Un’,(x + A,, S’, T - AR) + 2NA, + SNPA, 
o < u&, T) - U&v, T) d Unfk(x + A,S’, T -Ad - (5.4) 
C&(x + A,, S’, T -Ah) + 2N(l+ P)An. 
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As PZ tends to infinity the right side of (5.2) tends to 0 uniformly for .C 
in any bounded set. Hence the same is true in (5.1). which proves 
Theorem ‘1. 
VI. TIME-CONTINUOUS FORM 
Several definitions have been proposed for an analogue with contin- 
uous time of the game described by (2.5) and (2.6). The relationship 
between these definitions is not known in general. The one in [4] and [G] 
requires the existence of a field of extremals. The definition we shall 
give here is a variant of the one in [S]; and is in terms of time-discrete 
games with the time between successive moves not specified in advance. 
\Ve again consider times only of the form a dyadic rational number times 
the basic time interval T,,. It is merely a technical exercise to remove 
this restriction. 
=\ strategy for player I consists in choosing a positive integer k, and 
functions ai(x . . , a,(x), s = Zkl, with values in I’. Similarly II chooses 
k, and vr(x),. . ., z!,(x), t = Zk*, with values in Z. Let u = max (k,, k,). 
The payoff is calculated as in the nth time discrete game, using (2.5) and 
(2.6). If k, = 16, then I chooses yi = ui(xi), i = 1, 2,. . If K, < 12, 
then his strategy is defined by transplantation : for i = 1, 2,. . . , yi = zlP(xp) 
where $ < i is the largest integer such that $4, is of the form jAk,. 
Similarly for II. 
THEOREM 3. If both (a) a+~! (b) hold, then lim l’,(.~, T) is the 
?l+CC 
;sdtde of the time-continuous game. 
PROOF. Let 
l’(x, T) = lim Vn(X, T) 
n+m 
Define Ui(X) such that, for T = iAk, i = 1,. . . , s, 
L’k-(% T) = min [Akf(% %(X), Z) + VA-(x + dkg(% %(X), Z), T - A,+)j 
.? 
where k = k, is to be chosen presently. By the proofs for Lemmas 2 
and 3, this strategy for I yields against any strategy for II at least 
llk-(z, T) -- Qdk T. By Theorem 2 given E > 0 and (x, T) me map choose 
k, such that T is of the form jAk, and 
v(x, T) - F < &,(x, T) - QAk, T. 
Similarly, II has a strategy against which I can never get more than 
?‘(x, T) + F. Since E is arbitrary this proves Theorem 3. 
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VII. PROBLEMS OF PURSUIT TYPE 
One of the most important types of differential games with finite, 
but not prescribed, duration is the following. Let the position vector x 
move in a region R; and let the payoff be the time to reach the boundary 
B from a given initial position xi and an initial time t,. Isaacs pursuit 
games [9] are of this type, and also the problem of minimum time for an 
airplane to climb to a given altitude [ll]. 
Let us suppose that B is a smooth manifold. We require that R be 
connected, but B may have several components. We again fix To > 0 
and for n = 1,2;. . . consider time-discrete games with time A, between 
successive moves. In this problem f = 0, and as before 
xi+1 = xi + 48 &i, yi, 4, i=l,2,... . (7.1) 
The payoff shall be T if the polygonal path joining successively xi, x2,. . . 
first meets B at time t, + T. To avoid the possibility that play does not 
end we agree that if B is not reached before time To, then the payoff is 
To - t, + ~'O(xN+l), A,N= To-tt,, (7.2) 
where V”(x) is a given nonnegative function such that I/‘O(x) = 0 for x 
in B and VO satisfies a Lipschitz condition on any bounded set. 
In order to apply the analysis of Sections III, IV, and V we need to 
impose a condition to insure that, from any position sufficiently near B, 
player II can bring the game to an end in a short time by forcing the 
position to B. The condition we assume is: 
(c) There is a constant q > 0 such that for every x in B there exists 
z(x) such that, for all y, 
where Y(X) is the exterior unit normal to B at X. 
Let V,,(X, s) be the value of the game with initial conditions x1 = x, 
t, = To - s, where s = jd,, j = 1, 2,. . . , 2*, and x is in R. We have 
VJX, s) = 0 for x in B, 
V,(x, 0) = P-(x). 
The analogue of the recursive relation (2.7) for v/n is. 
(7.3) 





NY, z) = 
tld 1, 
A,, + V,& + A, g(x, Y, 4, s -Ah if tl> 1, 
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where ri is the smallest nonnegative value of t such that ?I i- ~3,~ g(~, ;\r, 2) 
is in B. Using (c) one shows by induction on i that the value I’, esists, 
is a continuous function of s, and that (7.4) holds. 
\4:e also consider the majorant and minorant games, with values 
r.nr, I-,-. satisfying (7.4) with min max, mas min in place of \.al. 
THEOREM 1. If g(x, ;v, 2) = a(x) + b(x, ~1) + c(s, z), where 6 a,nd c 
aye linear jztnctious in y and 2 for each fixed x, artd if (c) holds, theu Iv,,+, I’,-, 
aud F’, all ten,d to the same limit as 11 + 00. The cower,yewt is ,wliform 
OTC bowlded sets. 
The proof proceeds by modifying that for Theorems 1 and 2, and 
it would be repetitious to repeat the details. The auxiliary functions C,$ 
are defined as in (3.3), except now 
I 
t,&, if Tl< 1, 
The crucial estimate which must be added to reasoning in Sections III, 
II’, and 1’ is 
l’,+(x, s) < Ad, tz=l,i?,..., 
ck(x, s) < Ad, n>k, K=l,:! ,..*, 
where A is the sum of 2q-l and. the Lipschitz constant of I,‘O, and d the 
distance from x to B. This estimate is valid for x in some neighborhood 
of B. 
\‘III. REMARKS ABOUT STOCHSTIC MAXIMK~TION PrlosLEhfs 
Let us return to the situation in Section II and assume that f and g 
do not depend on z. For simplicity take x to be scalar. Suppose that the 
change 6x in the position during a small time interval C% is influenced not 
only by the control term g(x, y) 6t but also by a random term. Spe- 
cifically, we assume that 
dx a3 g(x, y) 6t + p(x) dt + oY(8t)l'2, x(0) = x1, (8.1) 
where 0 > 0, r is a normalized Gaussian random variable (mean = 0, 
variance = l), and or is a given function satisfying a Lipschitz condition. 
The random inputs during disjoint time intervals are to be independent. 
The problem is to maximize the expected value 
T 




The choice of Gaussian random variables is not arbitrary, but is 
forced upon us if we want continuous sample functions [7, p. 4201. If 
y and o are known functions of time, or functions of position and time such 
that g[x, y(~, t)] and a(x, t) satisfy Lipschitz conditions in X, then there is 
a well defined stochastic process corresponding to (8.1) [7, p. 3771. 
Suppose, however, that it is known only that 0 < o < c, where c 
is a given positive constant. Let us take a conservative view, and turn 
the problem into a game against potentially hostile nature. In this 
game player I controls y and II controls o. To describe the game 
rigorously one should discretize time. However, the analogue of (2.7) 
is an even less tractable recurrence relation for the value. It seems more 
interesting to proceed formally to find a partial differential equation for 
the value JY(x, T) of the (ill-defined) game with continuous time, We 
have formally 
W(x, T) = val exp W(x + 6x, T - dt). 
s/J r 
Expand lY(x + 6x, T - &) in Taylor series up to second order terms and 
take account of the fact that exp Y = 0, exp y2 = 1. We get 
WT = yj 
A 
$ w,, + [g(x*Y) + Pu(4lWx + f(%Y) * 
1 
(8.3) 
Since y and a appear separately, 
W T = a* W,, + pu(x)Wx + mpx [gk y)W, + f(x, ~11, 
W(x, 0) = 0, (8.4) 
a, = c if w,, < 0, 
a,=0 if w,, > 0. 
In particular if the value W is convex in x, then it equals the result 
obtained ignoring random effects. There will not in general be a solution 
of (8.4) with continuous partial derivatives. However, (8.4) suggests a 
discrete recurrence relation which may be more tractable than the one 
obtained directly from the time-discrete process. 
As another approach to the problem, let us take a = c and try to 
estimate for small values of c how much the maximum value for the 
process without randomization is degraded by the random effects. We 
make this estimate for the case when 
g(xt Y) = bx + $(Y), p(x) = 0, 
where b is a constant and $(y), /(x. y) are arbitrary. 
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For the deterministic maximum problem it suffices to consider 
controls y which are functions of time only. Let y(t) be any such func- 
tion, and 
w = $[YV)l. 
Let fi(~, t) the probability density that the process given by (8.1) with 
y = y(t) and o = c is in position ?c at time f. Then p satisfies the Fokker- 
Planck equation [7, p. 2751. 
$ Pm = p: + & [(hx + h)P]. 
Upon multiplying this equation by x and by x2 and integrating by parts 
with respect to x, one finds that the mean ml(t) and second moment m,(t) 
satisfy the equations 
dm,- 
dt - bm, + h = g(m,, y(t)), ml(O) = xl> 
dm 
2 = c2 + 2bm, + 2hm,, m&O) = x12. 
at 
As one expects, ml(t) is the path Z(t) obtained for the deterministic 
process with control y(t). For the variance z’ = rn.a - mi2 we obtain 
dV 
dt = c2 + 2bv, v(0) = 0, 
from which if b # 0 
v(t) = & (,P - 1). 
Upon expanding f(x, y) in Taylor series in x, up to second order terms, 
we obtain for small values of c 
Since y(t) is chosen arbitrarily, (8.5) suggests that if fx,> 0 then the 
maximum expected value is at least the maximum for the deterministic 
process for small values of c. In general the degradation is no more than 
Ac2 where 2 can be estimated in terms of T and bound for fx,. The case 
h = 0 is entirely similar. 
The author wishes to acknowledge a helpful conversation with 
T. E. Harris in connection with this section. 
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